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Abstract
We present a simpler way than usual to deduce the completeness theorem for the
second-oder classical logic from the first-order one. We also extend our method to the
case of second-order intuitionistic logic.
1 Introduction
The usual way (but not the original Henkin’s proof [3, 4]) for proving the completeness
theorem for second-order logic is to deduce it from the completeness theorem for first-order
multi-sorted logic [2]. There is clearly a trivial translation from second-order logic to first-
order multi-sorted logic, by associating one sort to first-order objects and, for each n ∈ N,
one sort for predicates of arity n.
Another way (due Van Dalen [12]) to is to deduce it from the completeness theorem for
first-order mono-sorted logic: Van Dalen method’s is to associate a first-order variable x
to each second-order variable X of ariry n, and encode the atomic formula X(x1, . . . , xn)
by Apn(x, x1, . . . , xn) where Apn is a relation symbol of arity n + 1. Then, this coding is
extended to all formulas.We write it F 7→ F ∗. However, to allow the translation between
second-order proofs and first-order proofs, one adds some axioms to discriminate between
first and second-order objects. The critical point is the translation of quantifications:
• For first-order quantification we define (∀xF )∗ = ∀x(v(x) → F ∗) where v is a new
predicate constant.
• For second-order quantification of arity n we define (∀Xn F )∗ = ∀x(Vn(x)→ F ∗) where
Vn is a new predicate constant.
∗Paru dans : Theoretical Computer Science, vol 308, pp. 227-237, 2003
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Then we add axioms relating v, Vn and Apn such as ∀x∀y(Ap1(x, y)→ V1(x) ∧ v(y)).
The problem is that this translation is not surjective. So it is not immediate to prove that
if F ∗ is provable in first-order logic then F is provable in second-order logic, because all the
formulas appearing in the proof of F ∗ are not necessarily of the shape G∗. It is not even clear
that the proof in [12] which is only sketched can be completed into a correct proof (at least
the authors do not know how to end his proof). May be there is a solution using the fact
that subformulas of F ∗ are nearly of the shape G∗ and one could use this in a direct, but
very tedious, proof by induction on the proof of F using the subformula property which is a
strong result.
Our solution, is to simplify Van Dalen’s translation F 7→ F ∗ from second-order logic to
first-order. The novelty of this paper is to replace Van Dalen’s axiom’s and extra predicate
constant by a coding F 7→ F ⋄ from first-order logic to second-order such that F ∗⋄ and F are
logically equivalent. To achieve this we consider that in first order logic the same variable
may have different meanings (in the semantics) depending on it’s position in atomic formulas.
Thus, we can translate any first-order formula back to a second-order formula.
Using this method we can also deduce a definition of Kripke models [5] for second-order
intuitionistic logic and easily get a completeness theorem. This models are similar to Prawitz’s
second-order Beth’s models [11, 1].
This was not at all so clear with Van Dalen’s method (as we do not how to end his proof)
if we need classical absurdity to use the extra axioms. We also give some simple examples
showing that despite a complex definition, computation is possible in these models.
Acknowledgement. We wish to thank both referees for their comments that helped a lot
to improve the paper and Miss Christelle Favre for her assistance in the checking for certain
proofs while she was preparing her master-thesis.
2 Coding
Definition 2.1 (second-order language) Let L2, the language of second-order logic, be
the following:
• The logical symbols ⊥,→ , ∧, ∨, ∀ and ∃.
• A countable set V of first-order variables : x0, x1, x2, . . .
• A countable set Σ of constants and functions symbols (of various arity) : a, b, f, g, h, . . ..
• Using V and Σ we construct the set of first-order terms T : t1, t2, ...
• For each n ∈ N, a countable set Vn of second-order variables of arity n : Xn0 ,Xn1 ,Xn2 , . . ..
To simplify, we omit second-order constants (they can be replaced by free variables).
Definition 2.2 (first-order language) Let L1, a particular language of first-order logic, be
the following:
• The logical symbols ⊥,→ , ∧, ∨, ∀ and ∃.
• A countable set V of first-order variables : x0, x1, x2, . . . (it is simpler to use the same
set of first-order variables in L1 and L2).
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• A countable set Σ of constants and functions symbols (of various arity) : a, b, f, g, h, . . ..
Here again we use the same set as for L2.
• For each n ∈ N, a relation symbol Apn of arity n+ 1.
Notations
• We write Fv(F ) for the set of all free variables of a formula F .
• We write F ↔ G for (F → G) ∧ (G→ F ).
• We write F [x := t] for the first-order substitution of a term.
• We write F [Xn := Y n] for the second-order substitution of a variable.
• We write F [Xn := λx1 . . . xnG] for the second-order substitution of a formula.
• We will use natural deduction [9, 12] both for second and first-order logic, and we will
write Γ ⊢nk F with k ∈ {i, c} (for intuitionistic or classical logic) and n ∈ {1, 2} (for first
or second-order).
We have the following lemma:
Lemma 2.3 If Γ ⊢nk A then, for every substitution σ, Γ[σ] ⊢nk A[σ].
Definition 2.4 (coding) We choose for each n ∈ N a bijection φn from Vn to V. The fact
that it is a bijection for each n is the main point in our method.
Let F be a second-order formula, we define a first-order formula F ∗ by induction as follows:
• ⊥∗=⊥
• (Xn(t1, . . . , tn))∗ = Apn(φn(Xn), t1, . . . , tn)
• (A♦B)∗ = A∗♦B∗ where ♦ ∈ {→,∧,∨}
• (QxA)∗ = Qy(A[x := y])∗ where y 6∈ Fv(A∗) and Q ∈ {∀,∃}
• (QXnA)∗ = Qy(A[Xn := Y n])∗ where Φn(Y n) = y, y 6∈ Fv(A∗) and Q ∈ {∀,∃}
Remark 2.5 In the coding, the same free first-order variable (this will not be the case for
bound ones) has different meanings depending on its location in the translated formula.
Example 2.6 (∀X(X(x) → X(y)))∗ = ∀z(Ap1(z, x) → Ap1(z, y)). This example illustrates
why we need renaming. For instance, if Φ1(X) were equal to x or y in (X(x)→ X(y))∗.
Remark 2.7 The mapping F 7→ F ∗ is not surjective, for instance there is no antecedent for
∀xAp1(x, x) or Ap1(f(a), a).
Definition 2.8 (comprehension schemas) The second-order comprehension schema SC2
is the set of all closed formulas SC2(G;x1, . . . , xn;χ1, . . . , χm) where {x1, . . . , xn} ⊂ V and
Fv(G) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn, χ1, . . . , χm} and
SC2(G;x1, . . . , xn;χ1, . . . , χm) = ∀χ1 . . . ∀χm∃Xn∀x1 . . . ∀xn (G↔ Xn(x1, . . . , xn)) ∈ SC2
where Xn 6∈ Fv(G).
The first-order comprehension schema SC1 is defined simply as SC
∗
2 = {F ∗, F ∈ SC2}
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It is easy to show that SC2 is provable in second order logic.
Remark 2.9 Let F = X(x) where Φ1(X) = x. We have:
• SC2(F ;x;X) = ∀X∃Y ∀x(F ↔ Y (x)) ∈ SC2.
• SC2(F ;x;X)∗ = (∀X∃Y ∀x(F ↔ Y (x)))∗ = ∀z∃y∀x(Ap1(z, x)↔ Ap1(y, x)) ∈ SC1.
It is easy to see that (∀X∃Y ∀x(F ↔ Y (x)))∗ = ∀z∃y∀x(F [X := Z]∗ ↔ Ap1(y, x)) where
φ1(Z) = z 6= x.
In general we have the following result : for each second-order formula G there is a variable
substitution σ such that
SC2(G;x1, . . . , xn;χ1, . . . , χm)
∗ = (∀χ1 . . . ∀χm∃Xn∀x1 . . . ∀xn (G↔ Xn(x1, . . . , xn)))∗
= ∀y1 . . . ∀ym∃x∀x1 . . . ∀xn (G[σ]∗ ↔ Apn(x, x1, . . . , xn)) .
We can now show the following theorem (we will not use it):
Theorem 2.10 Let Γ be a second-order context and A a second-order formula. If Γ ⊢2k A
then Γ∗, SC1 ⊢1k A∗ (k ∈ {i, c}).
proof: By induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢2k A, using SC1, remark 2.9 and lemma 2.3 for
the case of the second-order elimination of ∀ and the second-order introduction of ∃. ⊓⊔
Definition 2.11 (reverse coding) Let F be a first-order formula, we define a second-order
formula F ⋄ by induction as follows:
• ⊥⋄ =⊥
• Apn(x, t1, . . . , tn)⋄ = Xn(t1, . . . , tn) where Xn = φ−1n (x)
• Apn(t, t1, . . . , tn)⋄ =⊥ if t is not a variable.
• (A♦B)⋄ = A⋄♦B⋄ where ♦ ∈ {→,∧,∨}
• (QxA)⋄ = QxQXi1 . . . QXipA⋄ where Q ∈ {∀,∃}, Xn = φ−1n (x) for all n ∈ N, i1 <
i2 < . . . < ip and {Xi1 , . . . ,Xip} = Vn ∩ Fv(A⋄)
Remark 2.12 We don’t need renaming in order to define (QxA)⋄ since the φn are bijections.
Lemma 2.13 If A is a second order formula then ⊢2i A∗⋄ ↔ A.
proof: By induction on the formula A. ⊓⊔
Remark 2.14 The embarrassing case of decoding Apn(t, t1, . . . , tn) (where t is not a variable)
never arises here since we only decode encoded formulas. We can not say that A∗⋄ = A,
because in the case of the quantifier, we can add or remove some quantifiers on variables with
no occurrence. For instance, if X0 6= Y 0, Φ0(X0) = x and Φ0(Y 0) = y then (∀X0 Y 0)∗⋄ =
(∀xAp0(y))⋄ = ∀xY 0. ⊓⊔
Corollary 2.15 ⊢2i (SC1)⋄ ↔ SC2 which means that each formula in (SC1)⋄ is equivalent
to at least one formula in SC2 and vice versa.
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proof: Consequence of 2.13. ⊓⊔
Example 2.16 The aim of this example is to give an idea of the proof of lemma 2.17.
Let Γ be a first-order context, F = Ap1(x, y)→ Ap2(x, y, y) ∨Ap1(y, x) and t a term.
We have :
• (∀xF )⋄ = ∀x∀X1∀X2(X1(y)→ X2(y, y) ∨ Y 1(x)) and (∃xF )⋄ = ∃x∃X1∃X2(X1(y)→
X2(y, y) ∨ Y 1(x)) (where φ1(Y 1) = y).
• If t = z, then (F [x := t])⋄ = Z1(y) → Z2(y, y) ∨ Y 1(z) (where φ1(Z1) = φ2(Z2) = z)
and if t is not a variable, then (F [x := t])⋄ =⊥→⊥ ∨Y 1(t)
We remark that :
• (F [x := z])⋄ = Z1(y)→ Z2(y, y) ∨ Y 1(z) = F ⋄[X1 := Z1][x := z] if z is a variable such
that φ1(Z
1) = φ2(Z
2) = z.
• (F [x := t])⋄ =⊥→⊥ ∨Y 1(t) = F ⋄[X1 := λx1 ⊥][x := t] if t is not a variable.
and then :
• If Γ⋄ ⊢2k (∀xF )⋄, then (by using some ∀-elimination rules) Γ⋄ ⊢2k (F [x := t])⋄.
• If Γ⋄ ⊢2k (F [x := t])⋄, then (by using some ∃-introduction rules) Γ⋄ ⊢2k (∃xF )⋄.
Lemma 2.17 Let Γ be a first-order context and A a first-order formula. If Γ ⊢1k A then
Γ⋄ ⊢2k A⋄ (k ∈ {i, c}).
proof: By induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢1k A. The only difficult cases are the case of the
elimination of ∀ and the introduction of ∃ which are treated in the same way as the examples
2.16. ⊓⊔
Now, we can prove the converse of theorem 2.10, which is the main tool to prove our com-
pleteness theorems:
Theorem 2.18 Let Γ be a second-order context and A a second-order formula. If Γ∗, SC1 ⊢1k
A∗ then Γ ⊢2k A (k ∈ {i, c}).
proof: By lemma 2.17, corollary 2.15, lemma 2.13 and using the fact that formulas in SC2
are provable. ⊓⊔
3 Classical completeness
Here is the usual definition of second order models [7, 10, 12]:
Definition 3.1 (second-order classical model) A second-order model for L2 is given by
a tuple M2 = (D,Σ, {Pn}n∈N) where
• D is a non empty set.
• Σ contains a function f from Dn to D for each function f of arity n in Σ.
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• Pn ⊆ P(Dn) for each n ∈ N. The set Pn of subsets of Dn will be used as the range for the
second-order quantification of arity n. For n = 0, we assume that P0 = P(D0) = {0, 1}
because P(D0) = P(∅) = {∅, {∅}} = {0, 1}.
An M2-interpretation σ is a function on V ∪
⋃
n∈N Vn such that σ(x) ∈ D for x ∈ V and
σ(Xn) ∈ Pn for Xn ∈ Vn.
If σ is aM2-interpretation, we define σ(t) the interpretation of a first-order term by induction
with σ(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = f(σ(t1), . . . , σ(tn)).
Then if σ is a M2-interpretation we define M2, σ |= A for a formula A by induction as
follows:
• M2, σ |= Xn(t1, . . . , tn) iff (σ(t1), . . . , σ(tn)) ∈ σ(Xn)
• M2, σ |= A→ B iff M2, σ |= A implies M2, σ |= B
• M2, σ |= A ∧B iff M2, σ |= A and M2, σ |= B
• M2, σ |= A ∨B iff M2, σ |= A or M2, σ |= B
• M2, σ |= ∀xA iff for all v ∈ D we have M2, σ[x := v] |= A
• M2, σ |= ∃xA iff there exists v ∈ D such that M2, σ[x := v] |= A
• M2, σ |= ∀XnA iff for all pi ∈ Pn we have M2, σ[Xn := pi] |= A
• M2, σ |= ∃XnA iff there exists pi ∈ Pn such that M2, σ[Xn := pi] |= A
We will write M2 |= A if for all M2-interpretation σ we have M2, σ |= A.
Definition 3.2 (first-order classical model) A first-order model for L1 is given by a tuple
M1 = (D,Σ, {αn}n∈N) where
• D is a non empty set.
• Σ contains a function f from Dn to D for each function f of arity n in Σ.
• αn ⊆ Dn+1 for each n ∈ N. The relation αn will be the interpretation of Apn.
An M1-interpretation σ is a function from V to D.
For any first-order model M1, any first-oder formula A and any M1-interpretation σ, we
define M1, σ |= A et M1 |= A as above by induction on A (we just have to remove the cases
for second-order quantification).
Definition 3.3 (semantical translation) LetM1 = (D,Σ, {αn}n∈N) be a first-order model.
We define a second-order model M1⋄ = (D,Σ, {Pn}n∈N) where P0 = {0, 1} and for n > 0,
Pn = {|a|n; a ∈ D} where |a|n = {(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Dn; (a, a1, . . . , an) ∈ αn}.
Let σ be an M1-interpretation, we define σ⋄ an M1⋄ − interpretation by σ⋄(x) = σ(x) if
x ∈ V and σ⋄(Xn) = |σ(φ(Xn))|n.
Lemma 3.4 For any first-order model M1, any M1-interpretation σ and any second order
formula A, M1, σ |= A∗ if and only if M1⋄, σ⋄ |= A.
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proof: By induction on the formula A, this is an immediate consequence of the definition of
semantical translation. ⊓⊔
Corollary 3.5 For any first-order model M1, M1 |= SC1 if and only if M1⋄ |= SC2.
proof: Immediate consequence of lemma 3.4 using the fact that formulas in SC1 and SC2 are
closed. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3.6 (Completeness of second order classical semantic) Let A be a closed
second-order formula. ⊢2c A iff for any second-order model M2 such that M2 |= SC2 we
have M2 |= A.
proof: =⇒ Usual direct proof by induction on the proof of ⊢2c A.
⇐= Let M1 be a first-order model such that M1 |= SC1. Using corollary 3.5 we have
M1⋄ |= SC2 and by hypothesis, we get M1⋄ |= A. Then using lemma 3.4 we have M1 |= A∗.
As this is true for any first-order model satisfying SC1, the first-order completeness theorem
gives SC1 ⊢1c A∗ and this leads to the wanted result ⊢2c A using theorem 2.18. ⊓⊔
4 Intuitionistic completeness
Our method, when applied to the intuitionistic case, gives the following definition of second-
order models (similar to Prawitz’s adaptation of Beth’s models [11]). We mean that the
definition arises mechanically if we want to get lemma 4.7 (which is the analogous of lemma
3.4 in the classical case).
Definition 4.1 (second-order intuitionistic model) A second-order Kripke model for L2
is given by a tuple K2 = (K, 0,≤, {Dp}p∈K, {Σp}p∈K, {Πn,p}n∈N,p∈K) where
• (K,≤, 0) is a partially ordered set with 0 as bottom element.
• Dp are non empty sets such that for all p, q ∈ K, p ≤ q implies Dp ⊆ Dq.
• Σp contains a function fp from Dnp to Dp for each function f of arity n in Σ. More-
over, for all p, q ∈ K, p ≤ q implies that for all (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Dnp ⊆ Dnq we have
fp(a1, . . . , an) = f q(a1, . . . , an).
• Πn,p are non empty sets of increasing functions (Pq)q≥p such that for all q ≥ p, Pq ∈
P(Dnq ) (increasing means for all q, q′ ≥ p, q ≤ q′ implies Pq ⊆ Pq′). Moreover, if q ≥ p
and pi ∈ Πn,p then pi restricted to all q′ ≥ q belongs to Πn,q.
In particular, an element of Π0,p is a particular increasing function in {0,1} with 0 = ∅
and 1 = {∅}.
A K2-interpretation σ at level p is a function σ such that σ(x) ∈ Dp for x ∈ V and σ(Xn) ∈
Πn,p for X
n ∈ Vn.
Remark 4.2 If σ is a K2-interpretation at level p and p ≤ q then σ can be considered as
K2-interpretation at level q by restricting all the values of second order variables to q′ ≥ q.
Then we write K2, σ, q ⊢ A even if σ is defined at a level p ≤ q. This is used mainly in the
definition of the interpretation of implication.
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Definition 4.3 If σ is a K2-interpretation at level p, we define σ(t) the interpretation of a
first-order term by induction with σ(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = fp(σ(t1), . . . , σ(tn)).
Then if σ is a K2-interpretation at level p we define K2, σ, p ⊢ A for a formula A by induction
as follows:
• K2, σ, p ⊢ Xn(t1, . . . , tn) iff (σ(t1), . . . , σ(tn)) ∈ σ(Xn)(p)
• K2, σ, p ⊢ A→ B iff for all q ≥ p if K2, σ, q ⊢ A then K2, σ, q ⊢ B
• K2, σ, p ⊢ A ∧B iff K2, σ, p ⊢ A and K2, σ, p ⊢ B
• K2, σ, p ⊢ A ∨B iff K2, σ, p ⊢ A or K2, σ, p ⊢ B
• K2, σ, p ⊢ ∀xA iff for all q ≥ p, for all v ∈ Dq we have K2, σ[x := v], q ⊢ A
• K2, σ, p ⊢ ∃xA iff there exists v ∈ Dp such that K2, σ[x := v], p ⊢ A
• K2, σ, p ⊢ ∀XnA iff for all q ≥ p, for all pi ∈ Πn,q we have K2, σ[Xn := pi], q ⊢ A
• K2, σ, p ⊢ ∃XnA iff there exists pi ∈ Πn,p such that K2, σ[Xn := pi], p ⊢ A
We will write K2 ⊢ A if for all K2-interpretation σ at level 0 we have K2, σ, 0 ⊢ A.
Remark 4.4 Interpretations are monotonic, this means that the set of true statements only
increase when we go from world p to world q with p ≤ q.
We recall here the usual Kripke’s definition [5] of intuitionistic models:
Definition 4.5 (first-order intuitionistic model) A first-order Kripke model is given by
a tuple K1 = (K, 0,≤, {Dp}p∈K, {Σp}p∈K, {αn,p}n∈N,p∈K,⊢ ) where
• (K,≤, 0) is a partially ordered set with 0 as bottom element.
• Dp are non empty sets such that for all p, q ∈ K, p ≤ q implies Dp ⊆ Dq.
• Σp contains a function fp from Dnp to Dp for each function f of arity n in Σ. More-
over, for all p, q ∈ K, p ≤ q implies that for all (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Dnp ⊆ Dnq we have
fp(a1, . . . , an) = f q(a1, . . . , an).
• αn,p are subsets of Dn+1p such that for all p, q ∈ K, for all n ∈ N, p ≤ q implies
αn,p ⊆ αn,q.
• ⊢ is the relation defined by p ⊢ Apn(a, a1, . . . , an) if and only if p ∈ K and (a, a1, . . . , an) ∈
αn,p.
A K1-interpretation σ at level p is a function from V to Dp.
For any first-order Kripke model K1, any first-oder formula A and any K1-interpretation σ,
we define K1, p, σ ⊢ A as above.
We will write K1 ⊢ A iff for K1-interpretation σ at level 0 we have K1, σ, 0 ⊢ A.
8
Definition 4.6 (semantical translation) Let
K1 = (K, 0,≤, {Dp}p∈K, {Σp}p∈K, {αn,p}n∈N,p∈K,⊢ )
be a first-order Kripke model. We define a second-order Kripke model
K1⋄ = (K, 0,≤, {Dp}p∈K, {Σp}p∈K, {Πn,p}n∈N,p∈K)
where Πn,p = {|a|n; a ∈ Dp} with for all q ≥ p, |a|n(q) = {(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Dnq ; (a, a1, . . . , an) ∈
αn,q}.
Let σ be a K1-interpretation at level p, we define σ⋄ a K1⋄-interpretation at level p by σ⋄(x) =
σ(x) and σ⋄(Xn) = |σ(φ(Xn))|n.
Lemma 4.7 For any first-order Kripke model K1, any K1-interpretation σ at level p and any
second order formula A, K1, σ, p ⊢ A∗ if and only if K1⋄, σ⋄, p ⊢ A.
proof: By induction on the formula A, this is an immediate consequence of the definition of
semantical translation. ⊓⊔
Corollary 4.8 For any first-order Kripke model K1, K1 ⊢ SC1 if and only if K1⋄ ⊢ SC2.
proof: Immediate consequence of lemma 4.7. ⊓⊔
Theorem 4.9 (Completeness of second order intuitionistic semantic) Let A be a closed
second-order. ⊢2i A iff for all second-order Kripke model K2 such that K2 ⊢ SC2 we have
K2 ⊢ A.
proof: =⇒ Usual direct proof by induction on the proof of ⊢2i A.
⇐= Identical to the proof of theorem 3.6 using the lemmas 4.7 and 4.8 instead of lemmas 3.4
and 3.5. ⊓⊔
5 Examples of second order propositional intuitionistic mod-
els
In this section we will only consider propositional intuitionistic logic. Then the definition of
models can be simplified using the following remark:
Remark 5.1 The interpretation of a propositional variable at level p can be seen as a bar: a
bar being a set B with
• for all q ∈ B, q ≥ p
• for all q, q′ ∈ B such that q 6= q′, we have neither q ≤ q′ nor q′ ≤ q
In the case of finite model, there is a canonical isomorphism between the set of bars and the
set of increasing functions in {0, 1} by associating to a bar B the function pi such that pi(q) = 1
if and only if there exists r ∈ B such that q ≥ r. This usually helps to “see” the interpretation
of a formula.
This is not the case for infinite model, if we consider Q+, the set of rational greater than
√
2
is not a bar.
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Example 5.2 We will now construct a counter model for the universally quantified Peirce’s
law: P = ∀X∀Y (((X → Y )→ X)→ X): We take a model K2 with two points 0, p and such
that Π0,0 contains pi1 and pi2 defined by pi1(0) = pi2(0) = pi2(p) = 0 and pi1(p) = 1 (this means
that pi2 is the empty bar and pi1 is then bar {p}). It is clear that K2, σ[X := pi1, Y := pi2], 0 6⊢
((X → Y )→ X) → X. So we have K2 6⊢ P . We can also remark that this model is not full
the bar {0} is missing.
A natural question arises: if one codes as usual conjunction, disjunction and existential
using implication and second order universal quantification what semantics is induced by
this coding? If we keep the original conjunction, disjunction and existential, it is obvious that
the defined connective are provably equivalent to the original ones, and therefore, have the
same semantics.
However, if we remove conjunction, disjunction and existential from the model we only have
the following:
Proposition 5.3 The semantics induced by the second order coding of conjunction, disjunc-
tion and existential is the standard Kripke’s semantics if the model is full (that is if Πn,p is
the set of all increasing functions with the desired properties).
proof:
A ∧B = ∀X((A→ (B → X))→ X) : We must prove that K2, σ, p ⊢ A ∧ B if and only if
K2, σ, p ⊢ A and K2, σ, p ⊢ B. The right to left implication is trivial. For the left
to right, we assume K2, σ, p ⊢ A ∧ B, We consider the interpretation pi defined by
pi(q) = 1 if and only if K2, σ, q ⊢ A and K2, σ, q ⊢ B. Then it is immediate that
K2, σ[X := pi], p ⊢ A→ (B → X). So we have K2, σ[X := pi], p ⊢ X which means that
pi(p) = 1 which is equivalent to K2, σ, p ⊢ A and K2, σ, p ⊢ B.
A ∨B = ∀X((A→ X)→ (B → X)→ X) : The proof is similar using pi defined by pi(q) = 1
if and only if K2, σ, q ⊢ A or K2, σ, q ⊢ B.
∃χA = ∀X(∀χ(A→ X)→ X) : The proof is similar using pi defined by pi(q) = 1 if and only
if there exists φ a possible interpretation for χ such that K2, σ[χ := φ], q ⊢ A. ⊓⊔
Remark 5.4 If we compare this proof to the proof in [6, 8] about data-types in AF2, we re-
mark that second order intuitionistic models are very similar to realizability models. Moreover,
in both cases, we are in general unable to compute the semantics of a formula if the model is
not full (for realizability, not full means that the interpretation of second order quantification
is an intersection over a strict subset of the set of all sets of lambda-terms).
Moreover, the standard interpretation of the conjunction is K, σ, p ⊢ A ∧ B if and only if
K, σ, p ⊢ A and K, σ, p ⊢ B. However, if the model is not full and if the language does not
contain the conjunction, the function pi defined for q ≥ p by pi(p) = 1 if and only if K, σ, q ⊢ A
and K, σ, q ⊢ B does not always belong to Π0,p. In this case, the interpretation of the second
order definition of the conjunction is strictly smaller than the natural interpretation.
It would be interesting to be able to construct such non standard model, but this is very hard
(due to the comprehension schemas). In fact the authors do not know any practical way to
construct such a non full model. In the framework of realizability, such non full model would
be very useful to prove that some terms are not typable of type A in Girard’s system F while
they belong to the interpretation of A in all full models (for instance Maurey’s term for the
inf function on natural number).
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